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Dynamics of Healthcare Reform:
Bitter Pills Old and New
ChristopherN.J.Roberts*

ABSTRACT

The United States is at a crossroads-albeitone it has
visited several times before. Although the Supreme Court has
ruled upon the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the polarizing controversy surrounding
national healthcare that began several generations ago is likely
to continue into the foreseeable future. In this latest round of
national debates, the issue of healthcare has been framed
exclusively as a domestic issue. But history shows that the
question of national healthcare in the United States has also
been an extremely important issue for international law and
internationalpolitics. To shed light on the overlooked nexus
between the Act, U.S. constitutional law, and international
human rights law, this Article examines the debates
surrounding healthcare and human rights that occupied the
nation's attention over six decades ago.
In the late 1940s, the controversy over President Harry
Truman's national healthcare plan became known as the
nation's "Great Debate." But because Truman's plan never
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actually became law, this episode of U.S. history has largely
escaped the attention of legal scholars. This mid-century debate
over healthcare reform has had a profound impact on
contemporary domestic and international legal institutions.
This Article reveals how, beginning in 1948, the debate over
healthcare set in motion a series of political precedents, social
practices, and legal interpretationsthat have influenced every
subsequent battle over U.S. healthcare. But in particular,this
early debate over healthcare was an important factor in the
historic decision in 1952 to divide the Covenant on Human
Rights into the two treaties we have today-the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has decided upon the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The issue of national
healthcare is one of the most controversial and often replayed civic
debates in U.S. history. This Article explores President Harry
Truman's effort to enact his national healthcare plan during the late
1940s and early 1950s. The bitter controversy that emerged U.S.
exceptionalism that are taken for granted today: (1) the reluctance to
view access to healthcare as a universal right and (2) the rejection of
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incorporating international human rights into U.S. domestic law.'
But because Truman's plan never actually became law, this episode of
U.S. history has largely escaped the attention of legal scholars.
Overlooking this legal history is a mistake for two reasons. First,
while Truman's plan never ended up as law, this does not mean that
the underlying social and political struggles are in any way
inconsequential for contemporary law and policy. For example, this
particular historical controversy ushered in a new era of politics that
transformed the way such battles were fought. In the late 1940s and
early 1950s, private-interest groups on this issue raised
unprecedented sums of money and developed a practice that is now de
rigueur in political battles: the negative media blitz. Opponents of
healthcare reform saturated the airwaves, packaging fear and vitriol
into media-friendly bundles of distorted information. Indeed, these
debates over healthcare set in motion a series of political precedents,
social practices, and legal interpretations that have influenced every
subsequent battle over U.S. healthcare.
Second, the debate over national healthcare actually was a factor
in the development of law-international human rights law. But
interestingly, this piece of the healthcare story-which relates to how
the foundation of the modern international human rights regime was
literally split in two-has never before been explored. In recent years,
a small but growing number of social and legal historians have begun
to shed new light on the complex interactions between international
geopolitical concerns and domestic interests during critical moments
of rights formation. 2 While these scholars have focused on issues such
as race and civil rights, the connections between domestic healthcare
policy and international human rights have never before been
examined.
Through extensive archival research and the use of a new
interdisciplinary, socio-legal research framework, this Article exposes
a previously unknown side of the healthcare debates. This Article
shows how during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the nation became

1.

On the subject of American exceptionalism and human rights, see generally

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); for the
issue of healthcare, see generally JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED: WHY THE
U.S. HAS No NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (2005) (discussing the United States'

reluctance to adopt universal health insurance).
2.
See generally CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003)

(discussing how the Cold War and U.S. participation in the United Nations stymied the
ability of African American leaders to advocate for social and economic rights);
ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA'S VISION FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS (2005) (discussing how New Deal values influenced post-World War 11
international political and legal institutions); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(2000) (discussing the

relationship between U.S. civil rights conditions and U.S. foreign relations during the
Cold War).
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polarized over the issue of national healthcare as powerful interest
groups, such as the American Medical Association (AMA), joined
forces with influential political factions in the U.S. government. All
the while, a parallel, global debate over human rights was taking
place at the United Nations. The two controversies-the first over
national healthcare in the United States and the second over whether
socioeconomic rights were actually human "rights"-soon became
inextricably linked with one another. 3 The domestic controversy over
the United States' healthcare quickly became mired in Cold War
geopolitics and international uncertainties surrounding the decline of
empire.
Because scholars typically compartmentalize their studies of
domestic constitutional law on the one hand, and international
human rights law on the other, legal historians have yet to explore
how this earlier struggle over healthcare occupied both spheres of law
simultaneously. This Article reconnects these important pieces of the
history of healthcare reform. Indeed, negative domestic media
campaigns effectively linked the idea of national healthcare with
"socialized medicine" during these early days of the Cold War. 4 At the
United Nations, the State Department caved under the mounting
domestic opposition and took the necessary steps to define
socioeconomic rights as limited "goals" or "principles" rather than
actual universal human "rights." Then, in 1952, the original plan for
a single international covenant that contained both civil and political
rights and socioeconomic rights was scrapped. Despite the protests
from many other furious UN member states, the Covenant on Human
Rights (the Covenant) was split up into the two International
5
Covenants we have today.

3.
The socioeconomic rights under consideration included the right to medical
care. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.12,
2(d), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] ("The steps to be taken by
the States Parties ... shall include those necessary for [t]he creation of conditions
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of
sickness.").
This epithet is of course still hurled about six decades later. See, e.g.,
4.
Howard Rich, Special to the Tribune, Federal Overspending Is Path to Poor House,
TAMPA TRIB., July 18, 2010, Views at 1 (criticizing the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act as a "socialized medicine plan that represents one of the largest
expansions of entitlement spending in American history"); Michele Bachmann and Ron
Paul on WHO Radio (C-SPAN Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.cspanvideo.org/programlORad (describing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act as "socialized medicine").
5.
The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
On February 5, 1952, the General Assembly adopted GA Resolution 543 (VI), which
called for two covenants. G.A. Res 543 (VI), 1, U.N. Doc. A/2112 (Feb. 5, 1952).

2012]

DYNAMICS OF HEAL THCARE REFORM

The central argument presented in this Article is that the
opponents of U.S. healthcare reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s
created and reinforced enduring ideational and institutional
structures that now act as "safe havens" for continued legal
opposition against incorporating universal healthcare provisions and
international human rights law into U.S. domestic law. And now over
sixty years later, both the United States and the global community
remain constrained and beholden to a series of social, political, and
legal conflicts of an era that has long passed.
Part II of this Article outlines the early conflict between U.S.
domestic law and the human rights that were under consideration at
the United Nations in the mid-to-late 1940s. Part III chronicles the
previously unknown impact that the domestic opponents of
healthcare reform had upon the State Department's policies and
actions at the United Nations. Part IV shows how human rights
historically have developed through organized struggle. Finally, Part
V provides several theoretical and historical lessons gleaned from this
earlier struggle over healthcare and human rights.

II. THE LIMITS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
At the opening meeting of the Commission on Human Rights on
April 29, 1946, Henri Laugier, the Assistant Secretary-General for
the UN Department of Social Affairs, instructed the Commission to
include socioeconomic rights in the bill of human rights they would
soon draft. 6 Because modern industrialization inflicts "intolerable
servitude" on otherwise free individuals, Laugier informed the
Commission that "the declaration of the rights of man must be
extended to the economic and social fields" to include rights such as
labor rights and the rights to education, social security, and adequate
medical care. 7 A year later, during the First Session of the
Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, Eleanor
Roosevelt reminded the representatives that because of their
importance (and because they had been instructed to include them),

6.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Summary Record, Comm'n on Human
Rights, 1st Sess., 1st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/HR/6 (Apr. 29, 1946) ("[T]he progress of
scientific and industrial civilization has created economic organizations which are
inflicting on politically free men intolerable servitude, and that therefore, in the future,
the declaration of the rights of man must be extended to the economic and social
fields.").
7.
Id. This is only a partial list of rights that typically fall within the category
of socioeconomic rights. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 3, arts. 12-14 (establishing the
enjoyment of physical and mental health, education, and social security as economic,
social, and cultural rights).
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socioeconomic rights "could not be omitted. '8 But beneath the United
States' apparent support for these rights that enjoyed widespread
backing amongst many other members of the United Nations, there
existed deep anxieties about actually including them in a binding
covenant. So Roosevelt, who knew that the Senate was likely to reject
a covenant with strongly worded socioeconomic rights, hedged. She
added that socioeconomic rights should remain minimally articulated
and "could not be expanded too much in a Declaration."9 This was one
of the early signs of what John Humphrey-the Canadian legal
scholar responsible for creating the first draft of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights-later recalled was the "considerable
10
opposition in the Drafting Committee to their inclusion."
The competing desires to (1) keep socioeconomic rights out of the
Covenant, while (2) appearing as a cooperative and progressive leader
in international politics had the United States in a difficult position.
As Eleanor Roosevelt wrote in a letter to Secretary of State George
Marshall, the great political concern was having to state openly at the
United Nations that the United States, "in view of the fact that
Congress would have to ratify such treaties, can not agree to wording
which goes beyond our own Constitution."1 1 Accordingly, the U.S.
delegation to the United Nations advocated for a series of
covenants-first, one on civil and political rights, and then others in
areas such as socioeconomic rights. In this way it could give its full
support for the initial covenant, while not worrying as much about
subsequent ones. In 1948, the State Department remained "satisfied"
that socioeconomic rights were not being considered for incorporation
12
within the Covenant.
On the domestic front, after President Truman's reelection in
1948, many opponents of progressive social reform began to voice
their concerns about his national healthcare proposal. 13 Though this

8.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Summary Record, Comm'n on Human Rights
Drafting Comm., 1st Sess., 9th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.9 (July 3, 1947).
9.
Id.
10.
John P. Humphrey, The Memoirs of John P. Humphrey, the FirstDirector of
the United Nations Division of Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 387, 407 (1983).
11.
Letter from Eleanor Roosevelt, Delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, to
George C. Marshall, Secretary of State (May 11,
1948), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/eleanor/1948.html.
12.
For this kind of historical research, it is important to note that failing to
scrutinize political discourse beyond public statements and surface-level rhetoric can
lead to conclusions that run entirely contrary to actual history. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Whelan & Jack Donnelly, The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global
Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 910 (2007)
(claiming that "the West was not in any way opposed to establishing binding
obligations with respect to economic and social rights"). The analysis that follows
provides an abundance of evidence to the contrary.
13.
See Harry S. Truman, A National Health Program: Message from the
President, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Dec. 1945, for a discussion of Truman's plans to
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opposition was focused on the narrow topic of healthcare, it was
emblematic of an antipathy toward social-welfare programs and a
loathing of the stronger, universal category of socioeconomic rights. A
certain amount of opposition to his national healthcare proposal was
not unexpected. The New Deal programs enacted by Truman's
predecessor certainly had their share of opponents (and universal
healthcare provisions were not popular enough at the time to gain
inclusion). 14 Like previous health bills that had failed to garner
support over the past decade, Truman's proposal called for the
expansion of hospitals, an increase in public support for mothers and
children, and a system that would provide federal aid for medical
education and research. 15 But Truman's proposal was far more robust
than the Wagner healthcare bill of 193916 or the Wagner-MurrayDingell bill of 1943,17 for instance. The crux of Truman's plan was a
single insurance system that would cover not just the needy, elderly,

promote healthcare. See also MONTE M. POEN, HARRY S. TRUMAN VERSUS THE MEDICAL
LOBBY: THE GENESIS OF MEDICARE 140-73 (1979) (discussing Truman's efforts to pass
national health insurance legislation after the 1948 election); QUADAGNO, supra note 1,
at 7, 8, 34-43, 49, 51 (describing adverse reactions to Truman's national healthcare
proposal from the AMA, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and trade unions); PAUL
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 281-88 (1982)
(describing efforts to defeat Truman's national health insurance proposal by the AMA
and Republican members of Congress). See generally GEORGE W. BACHMAN & LEWIS
MERIAM, THE ISSUE OF COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE: A STUDY PREPARED AT THE
REQUEST OF SENATOR H. ALEXANDER SMITH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEALTH OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE (1948) (finding

that the existence of the problem addressed by compulsory health insurance was not
statistically supported and that compulsory health insurance would require excessive
government regulation); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCLL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1995)14.
See POEN, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing President Franklin Roosevelt's
decision not to include national health insurance in the Social Security Act of 1935);
QUADAGNO, supra note 1, at 22-23 (discussing Roosevelt's decision not to include
national health insurance in the Social Security Act of 1935 largely because of heavy
lobbying by the AMA); STARR, supra note 13, at 266-69, 275-79 (discussing Roosevelt's
decision not to include national health insurance in the Social Security Act of 1935 and
not to support the Wagner Bill in 1939 largely because of heavy lobbying by the AMA).
15.
See Truman, supra note 13 (outlining the major parts of his proposed
health program).
See BACHMAN, supra note 13, at 4 (describing Truman's compulsory health16.
insurance proposal); POEN, supra note 13, at 21-22 (describing the provisions of the
Wagner Bill); QUADAGNO, supra note 1, at 26 (describing the Wagner Bill's plan to
provide federal funds for state health programs); STARR, supra note 13, at 275-77
(describing the Wagner Bill's plan to leave health insurance as an option to the states);
Truman, supra note 13, at 7, 9-12 (describing Truman's healthcare proposal, including
his proposal for compulsory health insurance).
17.
See BACHMAN, supra note 13, at 4 (describing Truman's compulsory healthinsurance proposal); POEN, supra note 13, at 31-35 (describing the Wagner-MurrayDingell Bill. of 1943); QUADAGNO, supra note 2, at 26 (indicating that the WagnerMurray-Dingell Bill proposed a national health-insurance scheme); Truman, supra
note 13, at 9-12 (describing Truman's healthcare proposal, including his proposal for
compulsory health insurance).
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veterans, children, or mothers. It would include all Americans-even
8
those who were too poor to pay the premiums themselves.'
Though in 1948 the Truman administration believed there would
be enough support for such a proposal to become law, conservative
forces both in Congress and within the general public were strong
and well-organized. 19 These opponents viewed Truman's healthcare
proposal as part of a broader social and political trend that upset
existing social relations as the government encroached into
sacrosanct areas of social, economic, and personal life.2 0 Increasingly,
this opposition against social welfare was becoming enmeshed in the
anticommunist mood that was then gathering strength in the United
21
States.
The domestic response to Truman's healthcare plan (as well as to
his other domestic social-welfare proposals) became something of a
political bellwether for gauging the support for an international
human rights treaty that contained socioeconomic rights.22 Those
members of the Senate who opposed a universal healthcare system
and similarly objected to piecemeal, nonuniversal, domestic welfare
initiatives, would certainly oppose the stronger, universal
socioeconomic rights that would be included in a binding covenant.
Procedurally, if Truman could not garner a filibuster-proof, twothirds majority of the Senate to support his domestic health proposal,
he certainly would not be able to reach the same supermajority
23
threshold to ratify a covenant that included socioeconomic rights.

18.
See BACHMAN, supra note 13, at 4 (describing Truman's compulsory healthinsurance proposal); POEN, supra note 13, at 100 ("[Tlhe president stated that the
heart of his total program was national health insurance."); STARR, supra note 13, at
281 (describing Truman's proposal to create a single health-insurance system that
would include all classes of society); Truman, supra note 13, at 9-12 (describing
Truman's healthcare proposal, including his proposal for compulsory health insurance).
19.
See POEN, supra note 13, at 140-73 (discussing Truman's efforts to enact
national health-insurance legislation); QUADAGNO, supra note 1, at 7, 8, 34-43, 49, 51
(describing adverse reactions to Truman's national healthcare proposal from the AMA,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and trade unions); STARR, supra note 13, at 280-89
(discussing Truman's failed efforts to enact national health-insurance legislation).
See QUADAGNO, supra note 1, at 8,31-32, 33 (discussing the views of those
20.
who believed that national health insurance would lead to massive government
expansion and infringement of traditional liberties).
21.
See POEN, supra note 13, at 105-13 (discussing efforts by Republican
members of the House of Representatives to link national health insurance and its
supporters to communism); QUADAGNO, supra note 1, at 27-28, 31, 32, 35 (describing
Truman's opponents' characterization of national health insurance as "communistinspired");

STARR,

supra note

13,

at

284-85

(describing

Truman's

opponents'

characterization of national health insurance as part of a larger socialist scheme).
See POEN, supra note 13, at 140-73 (describing the domestic response to
22.
Truman's healthcare plan).
Rule 22 (the cloture rule) at the time required a two-thirds majority, but
23.
has since changed to its present-day three-fifths majority requirement. Filibusterand
Cloture, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/commonlbriefing/
FilibusterCloture.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). Article II, § 2 of the Constitution
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The State Department watched attentively as a groundswell of
opposition surged against Truman's national healthcare proposal. But
because the fate of an international covenant on human rights soon
became inseparable from the domestic battles over social welfare,
Eleanor Roosevelt and her State Department colleagues were thrown
headlong into what was already becoming a turbulent domestic
struggle.

III. THE OPPOSITION FORMS
Under fear of universal healthcare, in 1948 the AMA mobilized
rapidly. As one of the most influential organizations to oppose
Truman's health plan, its ability to mobilize quickly and efficiently
was largely a function of its already strong and well-organized, duespaying membership base. 24 It also maintained connections with highranking governmental officials and media outlets and had its own
high-profile publication-the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA)-in which it could disseminate its message
widely. 25 With these existing resources, it soon became a formidable
opponent of Truman's healthcare plan. 26 In December 1948, the AMA
House of Delegates-the organization's policy-making body-voted to
initiate a "national education campaign" to inform the public about
the danger of national healthcare legislation. 27 Its stated goal was to
fight "the enactment of a compulsory sickness insurance act covering
every person in the United States. '28 In its view, the government had
no place in this sphere of human relations. Healthcare was a private

requires two-thirds of the Senate's approval on international treaties before they can
be ratified. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
24.
See POEN, supra note 13, at 13, 15-16 (discussing the organization of the
AMA); STARR, supra note 13, at 284-88 (discussing the AMA's ability to assess dues,
raise money for public-relations campaigns, and recruit allies in the business
community).
25.
See STARR, supra note 13, at 282-83 (describing the AMA's campaign to
have doctors visit public officials and to garner the support of newspapers by increasing
the AMA's expenditures on print advertising).
26.
Organization materials put the membership at 140,000 in 1950.
Proceedings of the San FranciscoSession: Minutes of the Annual Session of the House of
Delegates of the American Medical Association, Held in San Francisco, June 26-30,
1950, 143 J. AM. MED. AS'N 975, 988 (1950) [hereinafter Proceedings of the San
Francisco Session].
27.
Id. at 987-88.
28.
AMA Tells How It Will Use $3,500,000 To Fight Ewing's 'Health
Nationalization,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1948, at 13 [hereinafter Ewing's Health
Nationalization] (quoting A Call to Action Against Nationalizationof Medicine, 138 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1098, 1098 (1948)).
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matter that should be governed by the free market of healthcare
29
providers and patients.
Domestic social-welfare policies on the one hand, and stronger,
universal notions of socioeconomic human rights on the other hand,
were actually quite similar. They both called for the government,
acting in a protective capacity, to mediate aspects of social existence
that were then often governed by the market, the church, the family,
or simply by life chances. For some, this offered much-needed
protection from the vicissitudes of a market-based civic existence. For
the opponents, however, increased government involvement in these
areas of society amounted to social tyranny. There were already many
in the Congress who opposed Truman's domestic social-welfare
agenda. 30 But its connection with the ongoing human rights project
that the State Department was then involved with at the United
Nations was not yet a legislative concern, nor was it a matter of
public consciousness.
It was William Fitzpatrick, the city editor of the New Orleans
States newspaper, who linked the parallel and ongoing debates about
socioeconomic rights at the United Nations and Truman's domestic
proposals as part of the same "pincer movement" to force alien laws
and social customs upon the American people. 3 1 As Fitzpatrick saw it,
there were now two fronts to the battle: one set of threats came from
domestic sources and another from the international. It was the latter
movement, largely occurring outside of the public's view, that he
concerned himself with in his editorials.
Now the potential for social and economic reforms came not only
from legislative fiat, but from potentially binding human rights
treaties. All one had to do, he warned, was read the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights-upon which the Covenant would be
based-to see that the United Nations had a "plan for worldwide
socialism. '32 He cited Article 22 (the right to social security) 33 and
Article 25 (e.g., the right to an adequate standard of living for health
and well-being, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, social
services; and the right to security in the event of unemployment,

29.
See Proceedingsof the San Francisco Session, supranote 26 (indicating that
the medical industry felt "threatened by socialization").
30.
See POEN, supra note 14, at 66 (attributing the success of the Republican
party in the 1946 elections to popular frustration with Truman's "economic-control
policies").
31.
95 CONG. REC. A1928 (1949) (extension of remarks of Rep. F. Edward
Herbert). Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-LA) inserted into the Congressional
Record a series of editorials by Fitzpatrick. Over the next several years, he reprinted
dozens of Fitzpatrick's editorials and speeches in the Congress to alert his colleagues
about the specter of "government by treaty."
32.
Id. at A1926.
33.
Id. at A1927.
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sickness, disability, widowhood, or old age).34 In addition to imposing
revolutionary changes to the freedoms associated with the "American
way of life," U.S. citizens would be forced to care for foreigners"social security for all the world, with Uncle Sam... footing most of
the bill. '35 As absurd as this last assertion sounds, Fitzpatrick was
quite in sync with the pressing debates of the day. At the time, there
were ongoing discussions in Congress questioning the wisdom of the
Marshall Plan and whether it was being used to fund socialist
governments in Europe-such as Great Britain, France, and
36
Germany-with U.S. tax dollars.
At this point, there were actually very few opponents who were
speaking to a broad public audience about the connections between
human rights treaties and domestic law. Most of the opposition was
preaching to limited audiences of academics, legal professionals, and
politicians. But as shown below, other journalists, activists, and
organizations would soon join Fitzpatrick and connect the United
37
Nations with social welfare and communism.
Given the early indications of opposition, Truman was concerned
about the Senate's filibuster. One potential way around this was to
amend the rules of the Senate to disempower the southern Democrats
by limiting the use of their procedural weapon of choice. Truman
initiated the push for a Senate rules change that would allow a
simple-majority vote for cloture to debate. 38 His attempt, however,
was quickly foiled by a bipartisan coalition of southern Democrats
and midwestern Republicans. 39 This setback-which amounted to
maintenance of the legislative status quo-imperiled Truman's
agenda. Soon after, Truman struck a conciliatory chord and faced the
reality that he would have to compromise with the conservatives or
suffer defeat. Truman assured both his opponents and his allies that
"the Congress and the President are working together and will
continue to work together for the good of the whole country."40 In his

34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
See 95 CONG. REC. 10,060 (1949) (Remarks of Sen. James Kern) (proposing
to deny Marshall Plan funds to any country "undertak[ing] to acquire in the future any
basic industry for operation by the state").
37.
This domestic/international human rights nexus is one key area of the
historical record that is often overlooked.
38.
See Raymond H. Geselbracht, The Truman Administration During 1949: A
Chronology, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.trumanlibrary.org

chron/49chron2.htm#fair (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) ("At President Truman's urging, the
Senate considers an amendment to its rules that would impose cloture to debate by a
simple majority vote.").
39.
Id.
40.
See Address Before the United States Conference of Mayors, 1 PUB. PAPERS
54 (Mar. 21, 1949), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/
index.php?pid=1072&st=&st1= (discussing the cooperation of the executive and
legislative branches in the contested housing-bill context).
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were
own prophetic words, he promised that he and the Congress
"going to agree on a lot more things than we disagree on. '4 1
Throughout 1949, the AMA continued to publish articles in its
journal that offered scathing critiques of Truman's national
healthcare plan. The arguments that appear in these JAAL4 articles,
as well as the statements and speeches of the AMA's president,
typically counterposed themes such as a compulsory insurance
program versus a voluntary one, socialized medicine versus a freemarket program, foreign socialism versus the "American way," and
government domination versus liberty and independence. 42 In this
campaign, these arguments were boiled down to several well-used
phrases, such as "socialized medicine," and "the voluntary way is the
'4 3
American way.
The goal of their "education campaign" was to put pressure on
elected officials by raising the fear and ire of the general public
through a well-coordinated grassroots movement. By July 1949, the
AMA had produced 25 million copies of twenty-five different
information brochures-each meant to appeal to a different target
audience-and shipped millions of copies to various state and county
medical societies. 44 Over 40,000 doctors had ordered color posters for
their offices that implored the government to "Keep Politics Out of
This Picture. '45 In its opposition to national healthcare, the AMA
claimed the support of over 800 other organizations, such as the
American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Legion, the
American Bar Association, the National Grange, the National
Association of Small Business Men, the National Fraternal Congress,
and the General Federation of Women's Clubs (the latter boasting 5
million members). 46 In the political arena, several state legislatures
(e.g., Delaware and Michigan) had already drafted resolutions to
submit to Congress opposing national healthcare. 47 At this point,
however, the AMA had not yet even begun to ramp up its campaign.
A. InternationalSupport/Domestic Opposition
In early 1949, the State Department was pleased with the draft
covenant since it was limited to only civil and political rights. By the
close of the Fifth Session of the Commission on Human Rights

41.
Id.
42.
See Proceedings of the Atlantic City Session, 140 J. AM. MED. AS'N 685,
695-97 (1949) (discussing the role of the medical profession in curtailing the effects of
"socialism" and politics regarding government intervention in the profession).
43.
Id. at 696-97.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 696.
46.
Id. at 697.
47.
The Delaware resolution was vetoed by the governor. Organization Section,
140 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 413, 414 (1949).
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though, things changed dramatically for the United States when
Australia and the Soviet Union submitted detailed proposals calling
for the inclusion of socioeconomic rights.48 The Australian proposal
included the rights to work, fair wages and reasonable working
conditions; the right to social security; limitations on working hours;
and the right to education; while the Soviet proposal included the
right to work; gender equality with respect to pay; the rights to rest
and leisure, social security and social insurance, decent living
accommodations, and access to education; trade union rights; and the
right to strike. 49 These two proposals were a very important
development for the Commission on Human Rights since they raised
the possibility that socioeconomic rights-which were already popular
with a large portion of UN member states-would be placed alongside
civil and political rights in the Covenant. The fact that Australia
joined the Soviets showed that such proposals were not simply Cold
War propaganda items-socioeconomic rights were of genuine
importance to Western nations as well. This was a troubling
development for the State Department.
By the end of the First Session of the 81st Congress in October
1949, the House and the Senate had failed to act upon (or had
rejected outright) much of the social legislation bills that Truman had
endorsed. 50 In addition to the civil rights legislation he failed to pass,
he did not muster the necessary support for the Point Four program
of assistance to underdeveloped areas, the Brannan Plan (aid for
51
farmers' incomes), or the extension of Social Security coverage.
Finally, his health plan, though not entirely dead in the water, was
floundering on dry pavement. 52 The AMA, nevertheless, was
unremitting.
According to AMA literature, government incursions into
citizens' private lives and business relationships was an alarming
trend in the United States-one that had already swept through
many European nations.5 3 Those invasions were apparently
destroying not only market productivity and business innovation, but
were responsible for spoiling the soul of American individualism and
personal autonomy. In this campaign to "educate" Americans about
healthcare, the AMA often used social democratic nations (Great
Britain in particular) as social and economic foils of the United

48.
See Comm'n on Human Rights to the Economic and Soc. Council, Rep. on
its 5th Sess., May 9-June 20, 1949,
23 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/350 (June 23, 1949)
(discussing Australia's and the Soviet Union's implementation of a methodical
questionnaire including questions about social and economic considerations).
49.
Id. at pp.48-50.
50.
The Point Four program was approved by Congress the following year.
Geselbracht, supra note 38.
51.

Id.

52.
53.

Id.
Id.
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States. Great Britain, the one-time dominant world power, had
apparently made a wrong turn down what the economist Friedrich
von Hayek had recently called "the road to serfdom"-a warning, lest
the United States do the same. 54 In this respect, the AMA campaign
capitalized on the U.S. public's familiarity with the postwar
difficulties many other nations were experiencing. Though not
necessarily a function of state socialism, the food shortages, rationing,
and even starvation in Eastern Europe had been impressed upon the
U.S. public by the Truman administration's recent efforts to garner
support for the Marshall Plan. 55 While the AMA's central concern
remained with domestic healthcare, a number of emergent
international social and political issues were becoming strong
undercurrents within its campaign rhetoric.
Even more menacing than social democracy-though for the
AMA only one step away-was the threat of communism. During this
period the campaign began to borrow the language and rhetoric of the
anticommunist movement that was beginning to sweep through the
United States. 56 What in hindsight can be referred to as mass

54.
F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1st ed., 1944). For examples of articles
using foreign-state economic systems such as Great Britain as a foil for the United
States, see William L. Hutcheson, Socialized Medicine Is No Bargain, 143 J. AM. MED.
AS'N 1268, 1269 (1950) (discussing how the costs of health services in Great Britain
greatly exceeded those expected); Amos R. Koontz, The Government Cannot Force
Socialized Medicine on Us, 143 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1113, 1113 (1949) (describing the
British government's actions toward doctors in England as "browbeat[ing] and
brib[ing]"); Proceedings of Meeting of House of Delegates, 147 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1576,
1577 (1951) (comparing the economic freedoms in the United States with the limited
freedoms in Great Britain).
55.
Both Truman and Marshall gave influential speeches in which they
outlined the economic and social suffering in European nations. See, e.g., Harry S.
Truman, President, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Mar. 12, 1947),
http:lavalon.law.yale.edu/2Oth-centuryltrudoc.asp; George Marshall, Secretary of
State, Speech at Harvard on the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947), http://www.oecd.org/
document/10/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1876938_ 1_ 1_1,00.html.
56.
See, e.g., Atomic Spy Inquiry Takes Surprise Turn, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1948, at 15c (revealing that Soviet efforts to access U.S. atomic information were
successful); Willard Edwards, Angel' of Reds Charged with Aiding Spies, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Sept. 21, 1948, at 7 (discussing an investigation surrounding an American who
financially supported the Soviets); Willard Edwards, U.S. Jury Paves Way for New Red
Exposures, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 21, 1950, at 18 (predicting that the indictment of
twelve persons linked to the Soviet Union would lead to more information on Soviet
supporters); Espionage: Two More Links, TIME MAG., Aug. 7, 1950, at 15 (detailing the
arrest of persons described as 'links in the Soviet atomic spy chain" and "in cahoots
with Harry Gold"); Joseph E. Evans, Compulsory Freedom, WALL ST. J., 1949, at 4;
Extinction of America, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 9, 1949, at 24 (referring to the "world
government crowd" that sought to unify all countries as "silly people"); House Group To
Sift Astronomy Lab in Congo Uranium Area, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 7, 1948, at B5
(explaining the investigation of the House "un-American activity committee" on stargazers in the Belgian Congo); Samuel D. Menin, The UniversalDeclarationof Human
Rights: A Challenge to America, 26 DICTA 122,122-27 (1949) (presenting analysis that
suggests the United States should not enter into binding contracts with other states
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57
hysteria or a "moral panic" was simply an opportunity for the AMA.
The AMA-like so many others during this period--could just point to
a handful of current events to stir the fear and fancy of the nation's
civic imagination. In fall 1949, for instance, eleven members of the
U.S. Communist Party were convicted of attempting violent
insurrection and attempting to overthrow the U.S. government. 58 In
January 1950, as the AMA was beginning to ramp up its campaign, a
former State Department employee, Alger Hiss, was convicted in a
case surrounding state secrets and a communist spy ring. 59 And
finally, with the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950,
communism became the official enemy of the state. Never mind that
there was absolutely no connection between Truman's desire to
provide adequate healthcare to all Americans and these events; they
all provided the AMA with the ammunition to make the case that the
communist infiltrators already had breached the United States'
ramparts. The greater fear, however, were those home-grown enemies
within the government who shared Truman's social-welfare
aspirations.

B. The CampaignBlitz
The AMA focused its campaign efforts on influencing the
outcome of the 1950 mid-term elections by replacing supporters of

regarding human rights); Mother of Two Held in Spy Net, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1950, at
1 (discussing the arrest of a U.S. citizen allegedly linked with Harry Gold for
contributing to the Soviet atomic-bomb cause); Shocking If True, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1948, at 22 (revealing an anonymous spokesperson's allegation that Truman and
Attorney General Thomas Clark had information about a Soviet spy ring but did not
act on it); Walter Trohan, Atomic Spy Ring of Reds To Be Probed, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7,
1948, at I (discussing the discovery of a Soviet spy ring); Truman Aide Linked to Spy,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1948, at 1, 7 (revealing a presidential advisor's relationship with
a Soviet spy); Truman Says Russ Have A-Bomb, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1949 at 1,4
(discussing the fear of "World War III" after the announcement of an atomic explosion
inRussia).
57.
For more on moral panic, see STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL
PANICS, at ii-iii (1972) (explaining how individuals or groups sometimes come to be
defined as a threat to the values and interests of the broader society); Jock Young, The
Role of the Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy, Negotiators of Reality and Translators of
Fantasy: Some Consequences of Our Present System of Drug Control as Seen by Notting
Hill, in IMAGES OF DEVIANCE 27, 37 (Stanley Cohen ed., 1971) (discussing the media's
ability to "engineer" moral panic about certain types of deviance).
58.
TED MORGAN, REDS: MCCARTHYISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 31416 (2004); PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE": UNITED STATES
PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947-1952, at 157-77 (1984).
59.

See T. MICHAEL HOLMES, THE SPECTER OF COMMUNISM IN HAWAII 12-14

(1994) (explaining the events leading up to Hiss's arrest and the public opinion of Hiss
thereafter). The fact that Hiss had served as Secretary-General of the UN founding
conference in 1945 did not ease the associations that many Americans had between
communism and the United Nations.
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healthcare reform with steadfast opponents. 60 This effort grew
considerably throughout the year as influential organizations such as
the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Commerce joined the effort to warn Americans about the dangers of a
state-run economy. 61 The culmination of this endeavor was a massive
media blitz timed to coincide with the November elections. In this
unprecedented $1.1 million advertisement campaign, the AMA placed
large, five-column ads in 11,000 daily and weekly newspapers, bought
airtime from 300 radio stations, and placed full-page advertisements
in thirty magazines. 62 The organization boasted that during the week
of October 8, 1950, every '"ona fide daily and weekly newspaper" in
63
the United States would carry its ads.
The AMA's campaign was designed to reach not just doctors and
legislators, but also to alert every American about the dangers of
"socialized medicine" and the broader "threatening trend toward state
socialism" in the United States. 64 Accordingly, the organization
created and promoted a wide variety of campaign materials to ensure
that by the November elections, virtually every major demographic
category in the United States would know about the perils of
"politically controlled socialized medicine."6 5 As an AMA official
explained, those who did not read the more "formal treatises" on the
subject would find quite illuminating the sixteen-page color comic
book entitled The Sad Case of Waiting-Room Willie.66 This
publication-for which the talents of a preeminent graphic artist
were solicited-tells the story of a sympathetic patient who is unable
to receive medical care in the "New Utopia" because all of his doctors
are overrun by "unsick" patients. 67 On the other hand, the

60.
POEN, supra note 13, at 176 (describing "organized medicine's multi-million
dollar attack" on President Truman regarding mandatory insurance); STARR, supra
note 13, at 284-85 (discussing the $1.5 million campaign discouraging the support of
"socialized medicine" as "the most expensive lobbying effort in American history" at the
time); Austin Smith, ed., A.M.A. Advertising Program, 143 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 744, 744
(1950) (describing a national advertising campaign urging Americans to support
voluntary health insurance and warning against the threat of "socialized medicine").
61.
See U.N. Condemned as Socialistic in Job Theory, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb.
16, 1950, at 14 ("[G]overnments have no means to maintain full employment, 'except in
a totalitarian society."').
62.
See sources cited supra note 60.
63.
Smith, supra note 60. For an example of the advertisements see, e.g.,
Display Ad 116, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 11, 1950, at 27.
64.
Smith, supra note 60 ("American medicine is determined to alert the
American people to the danger of socialized medicine and to the threatening trend
toward state socialism in this country.").
65.
Id.
66.
Will Eisner, The Sad Caseof Waiting-Room Willie (American Visuals Corp.,
1950). For a description of the comic, see Comics in the Fight Against GovernmentControlled Medicine, 144 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 46, 46-47 (1950) (describing the comic as
"readable, entertaining and non-technical enough to reach all the voters").
67.
Id.
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professional types who read national publications, such as the New
York Times, would find the AMA's imposing full-page advertisements
asking its readers in large, bold face print, "Who Runs America? The
68
Congress? The President? OR YOU AND THE MAN NEXT DOOR?
At its heart, this was a massive effort to shape public opinion and
motivate civic action.
Following the elections, the AMA claimed victory in two related
fields. First, it claimed victory in creating a grassroots campaign of
unprecedented size and power. They enlisted over 65,000 individuals
and organizations that together spent an unprecedented $2 million
dollars in a two-week period on the effort. 69 Second, the AMA believed
that the massive mobilization of opposition had influenced the
elections. The number of advocates of national health insurance who
had been replaced by opponents in the elections was cited as
evidence. 70 Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to disaggregate the
actual causal factors in this series of defeats, the scientific analysis of
71
electoral politics was not of great concern to the AMA's leadership.
Senators Claude Pepper (FL), Frank Graham (NC), Elbert Thomas
(UT), and Glen H. Taylor (ID), as well as Representatives Andrew
Biemiller (WI) and Eugene O'Sullivan (NE)-all supporters of
healthcare reform-had each lost their seats. 72 By the end of
November, the AMA had members of the Senate on notice: support
social-welfare initiatives at their own peril. These, of course, were the
same individuals who eventually would be providing their "advice
and consent" on the Covenant on Human Rights. 73 Whether or not it
included socioeconomic rights would very likely determine its fate in
this legislative chamber.
In a March 4, 1949, Gallup poll taken during the early days of
the AMA's campaign, about 60 percent of those polled had heard or
read about Truman's national health plan. 74 Fifty percent favored the
AMA's "voluntary" insurance plan, while only 32 percent favored
Truman's plan that was being branded by the opposition as

Display Ad 116, supra note 63; see Ewing's Health Nationalization,supra
68.
note 28 (revealing details of a discussion regarding Federal Security Administrator
Oscar Ewing at an AMA House of Delegates secret meeting); William L. Laurence,
A.M.A. Sets $1,100,000 Ad Drive To Kill Truman's Health Program, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1950, at 1 (describing the advertising campaign and its goals).
Elmer L. Henderson, President'sAddress to the House of Delegates, 144 J.
69.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1268, 1269 (1950).
70.
Id.
See id. (expressing satisfaction in the political involvement of doctors as
71.
individuals regardless of their political affiliation).
Social Security History: Chapter 3: The Third Round, SOC. SECURITY
72.
ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap3.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
Article II,§ 2 of the Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate's
73.
approval on international treaties before they can be ratified. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
Questionnaire #438, GALLUP POLL, questions qn4a, qn4d, qn5a (Mar. 4,
74.
1949).
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"socialized" or "compulsory. '75 Interestingly, the vast majority of
those who were familiar with the ongoing healthcare debates (over 72
percent) did not know any specifics about Truman's plan, yet still
knew which plan they favored. 76 In less than two months, the
had
percentage that had heard or read about the national health plan
77
increased by 16 percent to over 76 percent of the respondents.
Ironically, the public was still broadly supportive of socialwelfare programs-and continued to be so throughout the campaign.
By July 1949, 54 percent of respondents supported the creation of a
new Department of Public Welfare that would preside over social
security, public health, and education matters, while only 28 percent
disapproved.78 In March 1950, when asked about government
spending on social welfare, health, and social security, 41 percent of
respondents believed spending should be increased, 16 percent
thought it should be decreased, and 36 percent believed it should
remain the same. 79 Despite the greater support for government
involvement in health and welfare, the public continued to oppose
Truman's national health plan, with 60 percent disapproving of it
(versus 23 percent approving of it) by October 1950.80 The AMA's
campaign had done something. By the end of 1950, when asked what
the best argument against Truman's national health plan was, the
highest percentage of respondents replied that it was "socialist" or
81
"communistic."
The type of social-welfare legislation being promoted by Truman
domestically (as well as the stronger universal human rights that
were being considered at the United Nations) was now politically
toxic. It so thoroughly bore the taint of communism, internationalism,
and un-Americanism that the fleeting moment in which those policies
had a chance of survival in Congress was all but over. In 1950,
Truman dropped any serious push for healthcare reform as his
82
attention turned toward the Korean War.
The "socialized medicine" epithet that was thrown about so
liberally by the AMA finally stuck. It represented a conceptual basket

75.
Id.
76.
There was also a category for those who offered no response. Id.
77.
Questionnaire#441, GALLUP POLL, question qnl2a (Apr. 30, 1949).
78.
Questionnaire#444, GALLUP POLL, question qn18 (June 30, 1949).
79.
Questionnaire #454, GALLUP POLL, question qnl34 (Mar. 26-Mar. 31,
1950).
80.
Questionnaire#463, GALLUP POLL, question qn8b (Oct. 6, 1950).
81.
Questionnaire #467, GALLUP POLL, question qn9c (Nov. 12-Nov. 17, 1950).
Other reasons provided by respondents were categorized: "[d]octors would lose
initiative, incentive"; "[u]nfair to doctors .... [and] would limit the doctors[ ]income";
"[flower health standards [and] inefficient service"; "cannot choose your own doctor";
the "cost of program"; "[tloo much power for government"; "[w]orking poorly in
England"; "[plolitics would enter into it, lay the medical profession open to graft";
"would be abused"/"make people lazy and irresponsible." Id.
82.
STARR, supra note 13, at 286-89.
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within which the uncertainties of the moment-as well as a broad
spectrum of fears, social anxieties, and prejudices-could be placed.
This strategy permitted something as valuable and universally
necessary as access to decent medical care to become a "threat" to all
Americans. The organization positioned itself as a last defense
against the ill-conceived socialist mood that was "infecting" the world
and now was threatening to destroy the United States. By joining the
AMA and its growing network of supporters in the fight against
national healthcare (now socialized medicine), Americans were taking
part in a much larger battle against "the alien philosophy of a
83
government-regimented economy."
C. Keeping Socioeconomic Rights Out
Given the fervor of the domestic opposition against Truman's
social welfare proposals, the State Department was hard pressed to
ease its own opposition to incorporating socioeconomic rights into the
Covenant. In preparation for the General Assembly meetings that
were to convene on September 19, 1950, the State Department met
with the U.S. delegation to the United Nations and distributed
briefing papers that outlined a two-prong strategy for approaching
the issue of socioeconomic rights in the Covenant.8 4 First, the U.S.
delegation was instructed to support the creation of a covenant that
mirrored the principles and rights within the U.S. Constitution-i.e.,
one that did not contain any socioeconomic rights.8 5 James
Simsarian, advisor to the U.S. delegation at the United Nations,
discussed the Covenant in a State Department briefing session. He
explained to those present-which included Eleanor Roosevelt,
Senator Cabot Lodge, and John Foster Dulles (who was then a
delegate to the UN General Assembly and would later become
Secretary of State under President Dwight Eisenhower)-that the
State Department wished to maintain the general status quo with
respect to the Covenant.8 6 Importantly, at this point "only a limited
number of rights were covered-fundamentally the same area as that

83.
See Smith, supra note 60, at 744 (quoting an announcement from the
AMA's National Education Campaign intended to solidify public support against
"government-controlled medicine") (internal quotation marks omitted).
84.
Minutes of the Briefing Session of the United States Delegation to the
General Assembly (Sept. 8, 1950), reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1950: THE UNITED NATIONS; THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 516, 516-17 (U.S.

Government Printing Office ed., 1976) [hereinafter 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS].
85.
See id. (explaining that James Simsarian, advisor to the U.S. delegation at
the United Nations, highlighted the differences between the Covenant and the
Declaration in order to demonstrate the State Department's satisfaction with the
Covenant).
86.
See id. (noting that the Covenant required four years of work and the State
Department considered it acceptable).
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included in the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights."8 7 Thus,
as far as the State Department was concerned, the Covenant
remained in "satisfactory" shape "since loose language covering
economic and social rights had been excluded. 88 Nevertheless, the
State Department conceded that it was "particularly anxious," since it
states would try to push for the inclusion
appeared that many other
89
rights.
socioeconomic
of
With Cold War tensions rising, the State Department deemed
the cultivation of geopolitical relationships to be an important part of
its UN activities. 90 The second prong of the State Department's
strategy emphasized the importance of working with other member
states and not appearing obstructionist. 9 ' In addition to its
increasingly unpopular position on socioeconomic rights, the ongoing
(and very unpopular) federal state clause battle-a proposed article
that would have effectively barred many of the Covenant's provisions
from applying within its federal states-opened the United States up
to the charge that it was intentionally impeding not only the
development of the Covenant, but also the extension of its provisions.
The State Department stressed that the delegation should be
prepared "to join with other countries in inviting the Commission on
Human Rights to consider the desirability and feasibility of
developing further covenants or taking other measures concerning
economic, social and cultural rights as well as other categories of
92
rights in the civil and political field.
Merely discussing the feasibility of socioeconomic rights at future
meetings was far from what other member states had in mind,
though.9 3 In this respect, the United States, though wishing to "work"
with other states on the issue, vastly underestimated the value of
socioeconomic rights for many of the UN member states.
Consequently, the two strategic goals were in many respects
mutually exclusive of one another. If the United States adhered
rigidly to its strategy of creating a covenant that mirrored the U.S.
Constitution, it would be forced to oppose the inclusion of any

87.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 516-17.
88.
89.
The Draft First International Covenant on Human Rights, cmt.
[hereinafter Draft International Convention], reprintedin 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 84, at 509, 513-15.
Draft International Convention, supra note 89, at 509-10 (expressing
90.
concern that an earlier consideration of the Refugee Convention could result in other
delegations pressuring the United States to include socioeconomic rights in the draft
Covenant).
See id. at 510 (noting that the United States should support the
91.
reconsideration of the draft Covenant).
Id. cmt., at 513-14.
92.
93.
See U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg. to 299th mtg. at 117-90, U.N. Docs.
AIC.3/SR.290-.299 (Oct. 20-31, 1950) (documenting discussions regarding the
measures of implementation for the draft Covenant),
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socioeconomic rights at all. But if a significant number of states
strongly endorsed socioeconomic rights, this strategy would run
headlong into its second goal of working with other states and not
appearing obstructionist. So from the start, the United States boxed
itself into a contradictory policy approach.
At the General Assembly meetings, the United States'
satisfaction with the limited rights in the Covenant stood in marked
contrast to many of the other delegations' opinion of it; it soon became
clear to the United States that its stance on socioeconomic rights did
not sit well with the majority opinion of the General Assembly. 94 The
State Department expected the usual Cold War diatribes from the
members of the Communist Bloc who were amongst the most
steadfast supporters of these rights. 95 In this regard, they did not
disappoint. Stephan Demchenko, from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, said the draft covenant appeared "to be rather a digest of
'9 6
limitations of human rights than a catalogue of such rights.
Representing Poland, Henryk Altman's comments echoed those of the
other Communist representatives who all in turn voiced their
revulsion that socioeconomic rights-the "very foundation of
democracy [which] could not in any way be separated from the
recognized civil and political rights"-had not been incorporated into
97
the Covenant.
But what caught the United States off guard was the number of
non-Communist Bloc states such as Mexico, Uruguay, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Chile that shared the Communist delegations' desire to
see socioeconomic rights incorporated into the Covenant.9" What was
so disturbing for these delegations, though, were the broader
implications of producing an inadequate Covenant. Omitting
socioeconomic rights, many believed, raised serious doubts about the
future of the Covenant altogether. Dr. Raul Noriega of Mexico, for
instance, voiced his concern over the Covenant by arguing that "it
would be better to have no covenant at all if the economic and social
rights were not included in it."99 Omitting socioeconomic rights from
the binding Covenant would only send the message that they were of
little importance, and thereby "destroy the value of the Universal

94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 291st mtg. at 125-26, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.291 (Oct.
20, 1950).
97.
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg. at 117, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.290 (Oct. 20,
1950).
98.
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg. to 299th mtg., supra note 93. This is not
at all an exhaustive list of UN member states who wished to see socioeconomic rights
in the Covenant.
99.
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 298th mtg. at 178, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.298 (Oct. 30,
1950).
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Declaration of Human Rights."'10 0 Carlos Valenzuela of Chile voiced
his disappointment, saying that in its present shape, the Covenant
was wholly inadequate. 01' Like so many of the other members of the
General Assembly, "the delegation of Chile could not imagine a
covenant on human rights worthy of the name which did not include
economic, social and cultural rights and particularly the right to work
and the right to social security."'1 2 Perhaps, Valenzuela wondered,
the Committee should admit that attempting to draft an enforceable
covenant was an "over-ambitious project and even a dangerous one in
that it risked compromising the moral prestige enjoyed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. '10 3 It was not, of course, the
hope or intention of these states to abandon the human rights project
altogether. Much of the disappointment with the Covenant was of
course directed towards the U.S. delegation, which was the chief
resister. The type of diplomatic gamesmanship played here-blaming
without naming-was a staple at the United Nations, particularly
when confronting a much more powerful adversary such as the
United States.
As in so many of the contentious debates in the General
Assembly, the now very familiar division between colonial powers and
the smaller and non-Western states was a central element. The Saudi
Arabian representative, Jamil Baroody, said, "It was not surprising
that most of those who took that cautious position were
representatives of colonial Powers. It was plainly not in their interest
to accelerate the implementation of an effective covenant, since the
result in dependent territories might be to awaken the population
from its lethargy."'1 4 Nizar Kayali of Syria, like many of the other
delegates, voiced the opinion that the Covenant would be quite
incomplete without socioeconomic rights. 10 5 With the United States
and Great Britain in his crosshairs, Kayali suggested that the
opposition to such rights that came from some of the powers "arose
either from a superiority complex or from a keen sense of selfish
colonial interest, . . . Those imbued with the colonial mentality could
argue that such rights were good for the inhabitants of the
metropolitan country but not for the natives of the colonies."'106 The
colonial powers' steadfast resistance to including socioeconomic rights
in the Covenant, he continued, could be explained because these

100.

Id.

101.
102.
103.
104.

U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg., supra note 97, at 121-22.
Id.
Id.
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 299th mtg. at 187, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.299 (Oct. 31,

1950)
105.
106.

Id. at 189-90.
Id.
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rights would interfere with the ongoing "exploitation" of non-Western
10 7
states.
The United States did not have much to say that directly
addressed any of these arguments. Roosevelt provided a short
statement of the U.S. position that held tightly to the State
Department's playbook. Namely, the United States did not support
the inclusion of additional articles in the Covenant-it supported
completion of the document without delay, and finally, it supported
the future examination of socioeconomic rights for subsequent
covenants.' 0 8 The U.S. position in no way swayed the other
delegations, for on December 4, 1950, the Assembly passed Resolution
421 (V), which stated in no uncertain terms that because the current
draft of the Covenant was limited to just civil and political rights, it
lacked the most basic and "most elementary" rights. 10 9 Accordingly,
the Resolution called upon the Commission on Human Rights, "in
accordance with the spirit of the Universal Declaration, to include in
the draft Covenant a clear expression of economic, social and cultural
rights." 110 The Resolution, which passed twenty-three to seventeen,
with ten abstentions, not only delivered a major blow to the U.S.
delegation's hopes of avoiding socioeconomic rights, but also painted a
picture of a nation that was out of touch with much of the world's
people and governments."'
D. Domestic Opponents/InternationalTreaties
Throughout 1951, the opposition to domestic social-welfare
reform pressed on. The isolated voices of the early opponents such as
William Fitzpatrick were now joined by a resounding chorus of
detractors who-now mobilized and primed-trained their sights on
the dangers of international human rights treaties." ' All the same

107.
Id.
108.
See U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 298th mtg., supra note 99 (discussing the
matter of social and economic rights).
G.A. Res. 421 (V), at 42-43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/421(V) (Dec. 4, 1950)
109.
[hereinafter G.A. Resolution 421 (V)].
Id. at 43.
110.
See U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg. to 299th mtg., supra note 93
111.
(documenting discussions regarding the measures of implementation for the draft
Covenant).
See, e.g., Norma Lee Browning, U.N. Spreads Every Ism but Americanism,
112.
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 16, 1951, at 9 (arguing that many of the employees at the United
Nations are Socialists); Byrd Criticizes Truman, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1951, at 2
(reporting that Senator Harry F. Byrd criticized Truman's policies as a threat to U.S.
capitalism); Dangers Are Seen in U.N. Rights Code, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1951, at 6
(noting that the Senate would likely not ratify a human rights covenant from the
United Nations); Truman 'Socialism'Attackedby Byrd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1952, at 10
(detailing Byrd's criticisms of Truman's policies); U.N. Promotionof Socialized Housing

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 45:'1341

arguments that had been used in the previous years to object to
Truman's Fair Deal programs (e.g., the importance of a free market,
the "dangers" of socialism, and so forth) were still being hurled
about-only now, the prime targets were the United Nations and the
11 3
covenant the United States was then helping to draft.
The associations with communism and socialism that the AMA
had conjured in its campaign the year before were even more
apparent, not because they were actually present, but because of the
growing distortions of the anticommunist perspective. Many watched
as the United States sat at the drafting table with Communist and
Socialist nations-not only considering their proposals for
socioeconomic rights, but actually succumbing to their demands (e.g.,
General Assembly Resolution 421 (V)). 1 1 4 Business leaders recoiled
against what was now framed as encroaching limitations upon their
various industries by UN mandate. Alexander Summer, president of
Real Estate Boards, for example, lashed out against the United
States' involvement with the United Nations on behalf of its work on
housing, which he believed would lead to "socialized housing in the
United States. 11 5 Conservative Chicago Daily Tribune editorial
writer, Chesly Manly, warned about a "rising school of thought" that
believed that U.S. law was subordinate to international treaty law
and the dictates of the United Nations. 116 Another reporter wrote
that within the United Nations, people do not believe in capitalism
and individual freedoms: "The United Nations is one world, and that
world is international socialism .... You can read the same thing in
117
the soviet literature that circulates freely inside the U.N."
William Fitzpatrick received widespread recognition for his
work. Members of Congress embraced his ideas, the legal
establishment sought his company, and elite literary circles showered
him with praise.' 1 8 After his first series of editorials, the newly

Scored, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1951, at E3 (describing president of Real Estate Boards
Alexander Summer's objection to the United Nation's promotion of socialized housing).
113.
See sources cited supra note 108.
114.
See G.A. Resolution 421 (V), supra note 109, at 42-43 (noting that the draft
Covenant did not contain "the most elementary rights").
115.
See U.N. Promotion of Socialized Housing Scored, supra note 112,
(critiquing UN official statement on housing as "the doctrine of Socialism applied to
housing").
116.
See Chesly Manly, U.N. Aid Holds American Law Is Subordinate, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., July 29, 1951, at 18 (noting multiple expert opinions that UN treaties
could lead to the United States becoming a socialist state).
117.
Browning, supra note 112, at 9.
118.
Many of the speeches he gave to various bar associations were reprinted in
their respective bar journals. See, e.g., William H. Fitzpatrick, Address by William H.
Fitzpatrick: Editor, New Orleans States, 6 ARK. L. Rev. 312 (1952) [hereinafter
Fitzpatrick, Address] (stressing the importance of resisting socialism in the United
States); William H. Fitzpatrick, An Editor Looks at Some Law, 31 NEB. L. REV. 237
(1952) (discussing UN-proposed treaties and the theory of "Government by Treaty"); see
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anointed plebian prophet stormed onto the conservative lecture
circuit and spoke to bar associations around the country about the
dangers of human rights treaties. 119 He later left his local New
Orleans newspaper for a position as an editor at the Wall Street
Journal.120 For a second series of editorials opposing human rights
treaties, Fitzpatrick received a Pulitzer Prize in 1951.121
There was still support for human rights, social welfare, the
United Nations, and socioeconomic rights-it was just drowned out by
the opposition and silenced by the rising mood that condemned all
things international. A "leading American lawyer" quoted in the New
York Times bemoaned "you could not get a treaty incorporating our
own Federal Bill of Rights ratified by the United States Government
today."122 Referencing the disheartened human rights advocates from
various labor, religious, and cultural groups who were monitoring the
UN meetings on the Covenant, an April article in the New York
Times expressed great doubt as to whether the Covenant would ever
amount to anything, since there was little, if any, chance it would
123
pass the Senate.
The Senate opposition was now focused and fierce. One year
after the AMA declared its campaign victory, it invited two senators
to speak to its House of Delegates-the den of doctors who had first
"educated" the American public, molded opinion, and helped sink
Truman's domestic health proposal. 124 Still strong and mobilized, on
a flag-draped stage in Los Angeles's opulent Shrine Auditorium, they
welcomed Senators Robert A. Taft (R-OH) and Harry F. Byrd (D-VA)
to speak to an audience of over 6,800 doctors and members of the
125
public.
Just how strong the opposition was against virtually any form of
social welfare-let alone socioeconomic rights-was made clear. As
the informal leader of the "anti-Truman Southern Democrats,"
Senator Byrd maintained that the President was destroying the
United States' system of free enterprise-a system that was "a more
dependable guardian of peace than [the] United Nations [would] ever

also PULITZER PRIZE EDITORIALS: AMERICA'S BEST WRITING, 1917-2003, at 117 (WM.
DAVID SLOAN & LAIRD B. ANDERSON eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PULITZER PRIZE

EDITORIALS] (winning a Pulitzer Prize for a series on "Government by Treaty").
119.
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, Address, supra note 118.
120.
Tony Germanotta & Steve Stone, William Fitzpatrick, Ex-Editor at the
Ledger-Star,Dies at 96, VA. PILOT, July 25, 2004, at B4.
121.
See PULITZER PRIZE EDITORIALS, supra note 118 (winning a Pulitzer Prize
for a series on "Government by Treaty").
122.
Dangers Are Seen in U.N. Rights Code, supra note 112, at 6.
123.
See id. (pointing out fears that the Covenant would do more harm than
good).
124.
See Robert A. Taft, Senator, Address to the AMA House of Delegates,
reprinted in 147 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1576, 1576-78 (1951) (discussing the threat of
socialism upon individual liberties).
125.
See id. at 1576.
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be."'1 26 For Byrd, the "vague altruism" of Truman's social programs
and policies was influenced by socialist and communist principles. As
he saw it, the Covenant (which now included socioeconomic rights)
would destroy the United States' best asset against Soviet
aggression-a strong economy. 127 Taft offered the standard warnings
about the misguided path Great Britain had taken-a critique quite
familiar to any of the doctors who had attended past AMA meetings
or had even just glanced at the organization's campaign materials.
For Taft, it was more than obvious how outrageous and shockingly
dreadful things had become in Great Britain, where "the government
furnishes free service for the birth of babies, for the support of
children, for burial at death, and for every misfortune of life.' 128 This,
Taft forewarned, was also the goal of the U.S. Federal Security
Administration. This type of government control, he argued, destroys
businesses' freedom and individuals' incentives to innovate, while
reducing "everyone to the dead level of mediocrity. ' 129 For Byrd, the
type of programs in Truman's Fair Deal would irrevocably put the
United States on the "road to socialism.' 130 What Byrd saw at the end
of this "one-way street" was the welfare state. This, he told the
doctors as he drifted into a poetic lilt, was a "state of twilight in which
the glow of democratic freedoms is fading beyond the horizon, leaving
131
us to be swallowed in the blackness of socialism, or worse."'
Short of a major existential conversion, there was little chance of
changing the minds (and voting behavior) of these senators.
Accounting for all the others in the Senate like them, as Eleanor
Roosevelt saw it in 1951, the United States "would never ratify
economic and social rights in a treaty.' 1 32 Though conversions do
happen, to date the United States has not yet ratified the
133
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

E. A Legal Sleight of Hand
As the domestic opponents painted vivid images of the pending
dissolution of the United States' market society that were reminiscent

126.
Byrd Criticizes Truman, supra note 112, at 2.
127.
Truman 'Socialism' Attacked by Byrd, supra note 112, at 10 (charging
Truman's "socialist" policies would destroy America's productivity).
128.
Taft, supranote 124, at 1576-78.
129.
Id.
130.
See Byrd, supra note 124, at 1579-81 (1951) (expressing the need to
strengthen free enterprise and prevent implementation of socialist programs).
131.
Id. at 1579.
132.
Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the
General Assembly (Nov. 13, 1951), reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 84,
at 765, 767.
133.
Although signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, the ICESCR has not
been ratified by the United States. See ICESCR, supra note 4.
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of Hayek's allegorical return to serfdom, the State Department
struggled to maintain its position of moral and political leadership at
the United Nations. Having lost the battle to keep socioeconomic
rights out of the Covenant, the State Department chose to focus much
more intensely on the first of its two-prong UN strategy (creating a
covenant that mirrored the U.S. Constitution) while using "creative"
legal drafting techniques to honor the second prong (not appearing
obstructionist).' 34 To do so, it focused heavily on employing legal
mechanisms that would limit the reach and strength of socioeconomic
rights while maintaining the outward appearance that the United
States did in fact support socioeconomic rights. If successful, the
United States would appear to be a willing and cooperative
participant in the drafting process.
A State Department memo entitled, "Instruction to the United
States Delegation" outlined the specifics of this approach. This memo
stated that the draft covenant should be limited to "general language"
that related to the promotion and development of socioeconomic
principles rather than any articulation of them as actual enforceable
rights.13 5 To this end (and depending on the general sentiment of
other states at the Commission), the State Department proposed
three options that varied in specificity and strength. Each option was
intended to show other states that the United States was "prepared to
support the inclusion of such language in the Covenant," while in
substance creating a definition that would be as consistent as possible
with the Constitution. 136 The first proposal, designed to substitute for
the explicit mention of any substantive socioeconomic rights (e.g.,
right to work, right to strike, right to adequate medical care, etc.),
referred to as "Option A," read:
Each State party hereto undertakes to promote conditions of
economic, social and cultural progress and development for a higher
standard of life in larger freedom for all, with due regard to the
organization and resources of the State; and to cooperate for effective
international action in economic, social and cultural matters with
organs of the United Nations and with specialized agencies established
by intergovernmental agreement and brought into relationship with the
United Nations under the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.

137

134.
Department of State Instruction to the United States Delegation to the
Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 1951), reprinted in 2
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 84, at 735, 735-38 (advising that the language in the
Covenant should be in harmony with U.S. practice and constitutional principles).
135.
See id.at 737 (stating that the "articles are now phrased in terms of rights
to which all individuals are entitled immediately" and that "many of them must be
rephrased as objectives to be promoted").
136.
Id. at 735.
137.
Id. at 737-38.
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Note the legal sleight of hand: the proposed article mentions
"economic, social and cultural progress," "economic, social and
cultural matters," but never anything concerning "economic, social
and cultural rights." With the above text, in reality, the United States
would not be ceding any ground at all. Legally, this statement could
not even be classified as a "statement of rights." This, of course, was
the entire purpose of the statement-to establish a working definition
of socioeconomic rights that did not actually constitute "legal rights."
The U.S. delegation was after a definition that amounted to
progressive realization of principles and goals, rather than legally
binding rights. If, however, the other members of the Commission on
Human Rights did not support this vague, thin articulation of
socioeconomic rights, the State Department provided the delegation
with a second and a third statement (referred to as "Option B" and
"Option C"), each increasing in strength and specificity. Even with
the most forcefully worded "Option C" though, socioeconomic rights
were still articulated as goals or principles rather than being raised
138
to the level of "rights.'
In the event that the Commission rejected all three of the United
States' vaguely worded proposals and opted to list specific
socioeconomic rights, the fourth contingency plan outlined by the
State Department was to limit the "language as far as possible along
practical lines generally in harmony with American practice and
constitutional principles. ' 139 Fifth, the State Department also
reminded the U.S. delegation of another legal backstop it could rely
upon: any socioeconomic rights that did enter the Covenant would be
140
subject to the limitations created by the federal state clause.
According to the sixth and final contingency plan to defeat
socioeconomic rights proposals, the State Department instructed the
delegation to emphasize that much of the work on socioeconomic
rights is being, and should be, completed by specialized agencies,
such as the International Labour Organization, the World Health
Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
141
Cultural Organization.
The U.S. delegation carried out its mission with great
faithfulness to the State Department playbook, deploying its
mechanisms to limit or forestall the adoption of specific provisions on
socioeconomic rights one by one. 142 With respect to the actual drafting

138.
See id. (emphasizing U.S. opposition to the specific and concrete rightsbased proposals of the Soviet Union. and Yugoslavia).
139.
Id. at 735-36.
140.
See id. (advising that it should be assumed that provisions in the Covenant
"will be subject to a federal state article").
141.
Id. at 737.
142.
The Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Palais de
Nations, Geneva, met from April 16 through May 19, 1951. See Comm'n on Human
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of proposals, at times the delegation was allowed to "freelance." But
typically the U.S. delegation, which kept in close contact with
Washington during each of the sessions, was guided by the State
Department's policy papers, memos, and ad hoc instructions.
In addition to the official plan, another method the United States
regularly employed in its attempt to weaken what the State
Department referred to as "extremist" socioeconomic rights
resolutions was to submit a series of U.S.-sponsored amendments
that, little by little, whittled away at the strength and force of the
initial resolution. 143 For example, when discussions turned to
healthcare, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal stating that all
states had the duty to "provide conditions which would assure the
right of all its nationals to a medical service and medical attention in
the event of sickness."'1 44 The United States countered with a much
more delicately worded proposal that read, "The States parties to the
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.' 1 45 The
tactic of waging "proposal battles" was quite common at the United
Nations, and other delegations certainly practiced it just as fiercely as
l4 6
the United States.
Having assessed the support for socioeconomic rights amongst
the other delegations, the United States decided that it would need to
submit its proposal of last resort, its most strongly worded "Option
C," which read: "Each State party to this Covenant undertakes, with
due regard to its organization and resources, to promote conditions of
economic, social and cultural progress and development for securing":
education, improved standards of living, "measures of social security,"
"effective recognition of trade unions," labor rights, and "the
1 47
preservation and development of science and culture.'
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What on the surface presents as a respectable list of
socioeconomic rights, was severely limited for two reasons. For one,
just as with the aforementioned "Option A," the "rights" within this
proposal cannot, in fact, be considered legal rights at all. They were
articulated as important social, economic, and cultural goals that
states should "promote." Nowhere in the proposal are these principles
raised to the level of a right-i.e., an affirmative duty that signatory
states are under legal obligation to ensure. Over the next several
years, the State Department would continue to speak of
socioeconomic rights as not constituting "true legal rights," using
quotation marks around the word "rights" whenever mentioning
socioeconomic rights in its writings. 148 Second, the United States soon
after submitted a "limitations clause" that further eroded the
strength of this already weak proposal. It read:
Each State Party to this Covenant recognizes that in the enjoyment
of those rights provided by the State in conformity with this Part of the
Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as
are determined by law and solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
149
welfare in a democratic society.

Thus, any state that would be obligated to enact socioeconomic
rights would also be able to limit its obligations to guarantee those
rights only to the extent it determines that the socioeconomic rights
do not conflict with others' rights and freedoms. Since rights usually,
if not always, conflict with other existing provisions of law, this
limitations clause would essentially give a signatory carte blanche
ability to derogate from its socioeconomic rights obligations. With this
proposal (which did not survive the drafting process), the United
States essentially would be able to decide whether any of the
socioeconomic rights applied. The State Department later wrote that
the U.S. delegation
urged the inclusion of this provision.., to make it clear that the
economic, social, and cultural rights recognized would not be absolute

148.
For examples of this practice, see Eleanor Roosevelt, Progress Toward
Completion of Human Rights Covenants, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1024 (1952) (asserting
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149.
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but subject to reasonable limitations. In the case of social security, for
example, it is sometimes necessary to condition disability benefits
payable to disabled workers on their willingness to take vocational
rehabilitation courses. 1 5 0

The State Department later wrote about its strategy in the State
Department Bulletin that was published just after the Commission's
meetings. It maintained that the Covenant was being drafted in the
image of the U.S. Bill of Rights-"The basic civil and political rights
set forth in the draft covenant are well known in American tradition
and law."''1 The socioeconomic rights in the draft covenant, however,
"were recognized as objectives to be achieved 'progressively':
The term "rights" is used with respect to both the civil and political
provisions as well as the economic, social, and cultural provisions. This
term is used, however, in two different senses. The civil and political
rights are looked upon as "rights" to be given effect almost immediately.
The economic, social, and cultural rights although recognized as
"rights" are looked upon as objectives toward which states adhering to
15 2
the covenant would undertake to strive.

Just as the United States had done with its reservation in the
Commission, the State Department used the Bulletin to publicize its
position that socioeconomic rights did not constitute "real rights."
Thus, largely through the submission of substantive proposals, the
United States set up a legal gauntlet, hoping that these socioeconomic
rights would become skewered upon one or more of its procedural
barbs.
Historians typically treat UN deliberations as matters of politics
and law-and indeed these were. But from the perspective taken in
the present study, they are also the indicators of the underlying
domestic and international social struggles of the day. The use of
what the State Department termed "creative" legal drafting was part
of the very same social struggle that the smaller and non-Western
states, William Fitzpatrick, the AMA, and Senators Taft and Byrd
were all engaging in. Though each fought in their own theater; they
were all attempting to create structures (be they legal, ideological,
political, or institutional) that permitted a certain type of social
ordering to take root within their confines. Once these structures
became a reality and took form, they would shield certain specific,
desired social relationships (e.g., a market-centered society) from
outside assault by competing social configurations (e.g., a statecentered society).
In form, the social and economic rights that were being drafted
at the United Nations
permitted particular international
relationships to develop. For the United States, they allowed key Cold
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War alliances between itself and the smaller and non-Western states.
For the smaller and non-Western states, socioeconomic rights
represented a progressive alternative to the past era of colonial
domination. On the domestic side, the U.S. delegation also used its
legal drafting techniques to carve out an institutional sphere within
which a particular class of domestic social and political relationships
could flourish. These social relationships, in large part, were the ones
that the domestic opposition had already defined: a relatively small,
noninterventionist government and a free-market environment. 153 In
essence, the United States sought to draft social and economic rights,
without social and economic "rights" (and perhaps this is why the
State Department referred to its drafting techniques as "creative").
Once the U.S. delegation had defined socioeconomic rights, not
as "rights" but as "goals" or "principles," it had paved the way for its
next move. On May 19, 1951, it informed the Commission that it was
"now of the view that the provisions in the [draft covenant] dealing
with economic, social, and cultural rights-being loosely drafted and
not being expressed in terms of legal rights and with different
implementation and undertaking-should be dealt with in a separate
legal instrument." 154 What the State Department had not anticipated
fully, however, was that the strength and force with which it executed
its agenda might in fact lead to its own undoing.

III. RIGHTS

EMERGE FROM STRUGGLE

While the United States' comparatively vast diplomatic
resources permitted a powerful approach and a technical dexterity
over matters of law that was virtually impervious to attack, it was
quite vulnerable to public opinion. For when members of the United
Nations excoriated the United States over its human rights drafting
policies, they were talking-through the media-to the people of the
world. Charles Malik of Lebanon (then-chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights), for example, lamented before the press that the
draft covenant embodied a "certain lack of balance" between civil and

To explain such dilemmas, political scientists often invoke Putnam's two153.
level game model that explains state action as a function of both external and internal
political constraints. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (discussing the entanglement of
domestic and international politics). But this two-level game model, however, focuses
on the state as the central actor. While the state is an extremely important actor in
such histories, it is not the only one, and in certain cases not even the most important
one.
154.
U.N. Doc. E/1992, supra note 142. This desire to reconsider the inclusion of
socioeconomic rights within a single covenant was incorporated into a formal resolution
(G.A. Res. 349 (XI)) that was ultimately defeated.
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political rights and socioeconomic rights. 155 This, of course, was the
very lack of balance that Eleanor Roosevelt and the State
Department were fighting for. 156 But suddenly, what in the United
Nations was simply a matter of legal and political difference, in the
New York Times became an epic struggle between the two titans of
the United Nations-a news story wonderfully fit for print.
As reported in the New York Times, the problem for Malik was
that certain rights, such as social security, were only listed in the
vaguest of terms, and signatory states only agreed to "progressively"
strive for the socioeconomic rights within the limits of available
resources. 15 7 Both items were entirely consistent with the State
Department's policy approach discussed above. In the same New York
Times article, Eleanor Roosevelt is cited (off the record) as saying that
progress had been made toward defining the difference between civil
and political rights as legal rights and socioeconomic rights as "no
more than aspirations or norms ... to aspire to."'158 Furthermore, no
matter how these rights were defined, the United States would not
sign any covenant without a federal state clause that would prevent
socioeconomic rights from being implemented in the U.S. federal
states. 159 And finally, "[wlith such a clause the convention would
have very little practical impact on United States law or practice.' 160
This debate was difficult enough to navigate within the confines
of the United Nations. Now, it was on display for the world-a world
that often interpreted the same human rights in entirely different
ways. U.S. opponents of the Covenant, for example, were outraged at
any mention of socioeconomic rights, which to them implied an
assortment of social evils ranging from increased government
involvement in their lives to a full-fledged state-run economy,
socialism, communist infiltration, and the end of American life as it
was. The smaller and non-Western states saw socioeconomic rights as
indicating the end of a long era of imperialism in which human

155.
Rights Covenant Partly Drafted, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1951, at 18.
156.
See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.298, supra note 95, at 177 (France stating in
agreement with the United States that economic, social, and cultural rights could not
be included in the first covenant on human rights).
157.
Rights Covenant PartlyDrafted, supra note 155.
158.
Id.
159.
See id. (noting that the United States would not sign a convention "without
a clause providing for the special problems of its individual states").
160.
Id. Though these are not direct quotes, and the Times article does not
provide the source of these assessments, it closely associates them with Roosevelt.
These assertions are consistent with relevant State Department papers, private
meetings among delegation officials, and other State Department publications written
both by Roosevelt and others (e.g. Simsarian). See, e.g., U.S. in U.N. Urges Two Rights
Pacts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1951, at 22 (reporting the reasons the United States
"regarded political and economic-social rights as essentially unmixable").
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livelihood was sacrificed for the economic gain of the metropole. 16 1 A
power such as the United States refusing to abide by basic principles
that the rest of the world supported indicated a broad chasm between
the "West and the rest" and was reminiscent (if not an outright
reproduction) of the very systems of imperialism they were trying to
shed. 162 Finally, the Communist states had based their entire
economy and social order on related principles that, if subordinated in
the Covenant to the civil and political rights the United States prized,
would send a message to the world about the appropriateness of their
own system. 163 The very same human rights had a wide range of
disparate civic meanings and social translations. In the UN debates,
the representatives were speaking about the same subject, using the
"universal" language of human rights to do so, while engaging in
familiar diplomatic conventions and well-tried legal drafting
techniques. But they were a universe away from one another once
human rights were given social meaning.
Less than two weeks after their differences had been aired to the
world in the New York Times, Malik and Roosevelt were sitting
together trying to locate common ground. 164 Malik explained the
deeply important social meaning of the human rights that the United
States was now opposing. 165 Their conversation revealed a major
blind spot for the United States. Many of the lesser-developed
nations, he explained, were experiencing degrees of social and

161.
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg. to 299th mtg., supra note 93
(expressing smaller countries' disapproval that national self-determination, among
other "rights," was not included in the Covenant draft); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 180th
mtg. to 183d mtg. at 852-935, U.N. Docs. A/PV.180-183 (Dec. 9-10, 1948) (including
criticism from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic of the economic system of private
enterprise due to its "constant expansion of capitalist monopolies and the growth of
military expenditure," in contrast to an alleged lack of provision for the needs of
workers); Letter from Eleanor Roosevelt, Chair, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, to
Harry
S.
Truman,
President
(May
27,
1951),
available
at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/eleanor/eleanordoctemplate.php?pagenumber=4&docum
entid=hst9510527 (emphasizing the developing world's desire for a higher standard of
living and its willingness to fight for "tangible" social and economic rights); see also
Rights Covenant Partly Drafted, supra note 155 (listing what the Commission
considered to be economic and social rights).
162.
See U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg. to 299th mtg, supra note 93
(reporting the United States' minority position at odds with the majority of small
nations).
163.
See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 180th mtg. at 855, U.N. Doc. A/PV.180 (Dec. 9,
1948) (outlining the various priorities of the different countries).
164.
See Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James Simsarian of the Office of
United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (May 29, 1951) [hereinafter Simsarian
Memorandum], reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 84, at 740, 740-44
(reporting on a meeting and conversation between Roosevelt and Malik, among others,
concerning the Covenant).
165.
See id. at 741 (expressing the confusion and resentment by underdeveloped countries at United States' unwillingness to state economic and social
articles as rights).
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political turmoil. 166 Endemic political "incompetence and corruption,"
as well as "tremendous social and cultural problems," created a
situation in which they looked towards the United Nations for
leadership. 16 7 Within the United Nations, it was the United States in
particular that could provide that leadership. 168 As Malik and other
representatives confided in Roosevelt, "the Economic and Social
Articles had become a symbol of the aspirations and needs of these
69
countries."1
A subsequent letter written by Eleanor Roosevelt to President
Truman revealed that these conversations left an impression on her.
She began by saying she believed that the United States must
"understand that there is a feeling in the world of a desire to attain
some kind of a better standard of living and they feel that
particularly the United States has an obligation to make the plans
and help them to carry them out to attain those standards. '170 She
went on to explain that the United States was missing key
opportunities to win the support of smaller states that generally had
"highly mixed" feelings about the United States and might even be
leaning towards the Soviet Union. 171 "They are afraid of the USSR,"
she continued, "but in some ways most of these nations have never
known freedom and therefore it is almost easier to accept the type of
totalitarian system that tells them definitely what to do than it does
to accept the democratic system which seems to require so much of
them."'1 72 With respect to the nations of the Near East, Malik had
assured her that "unless [the United States was] going to take hold,
the USSR undoubtedly would.' 7 3 Unfortunately for the United
States, socioeconomic rights-an issue area where it could have
cultivated important allies-was the precise area in which it was
actively creating opponents. Roosevelt closed her letter by outlining
the bind the United States was in. For the developing states,
socioeconomic rights were of utmost importance-"those are the
rights that mean something tangible to them in their every day
lives."'1 74 On the other hand, the domestic opposition to the

166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
See id. (insisting that the "United States must both tell these countries
what to do and how to do it").
169.
Id.
170.
Letter from Eleanor Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman, supra note 161.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.; Simsarian Memorandum, supra note 164, at 740-44.
174.
Letter from Eleanor Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman, sitpra note 161.
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Covenant-and certainly a covenant with socioeconomic rights-was
strong and active. 1 75 In a letter to President Truman, she mused:
How we are going to explain all this to the American Bar Association
and Congress I really do not know, but somehow it has to be got across
because everywhere the emphasis is going to be on how they are going
to get a sense of hope of attaining even one notch on the upward
76
path. 1

When the Economic and Social Council met for its thirteenth
session later in the summer of 1951, the U.S. delegation sensed that
there might be a small opening for it to lobby again for two
covenants. 177 Though the two-covenant solution remained hugely
unpopular with many of the delegations, there were several now that
backed the United States' efforts. 7 8 The United States saw it as its
job to influence, sway, and actually "create" the majority that would
go along with it. 1 79 Given its power and resources, one method the
United States was quite adept at (acknowledged in State Department
papers) was "armtwisting.'' 80 Though the United States was often
accused of "throwing its weight around" too much at the United
Nations, it was a price it was willing to pay to prevail on such
matters.' 8 ' On February 5, 1952, the General Assembly adopted GA
Resolution 543 (VI), which called for two covenants by a vote of
twenty-seven to twenty, with three abstentions.' 8 2 The United States
prevailed in its effort to see two covenants created by the United
Nations, but not without inflicting significant collateral damage. John
Humphrey later wrote that this decision split not only the Covenant
18 3
into two, but also the United Nations itself.

See id. (explaining the tension between countries looking to the United
175.
States for guidance and support in incorporating economic and social "rights" and U.S.
resistance to declaring economic rights).
Id.
176.
177.
See generally Paper Prepared by the U.N. Planning Staff, Bureau of U.N.
Affairs, the General Assembly and the Security Council [hereinafter U.N. Planning
Staff Paper], reprinted in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 143, at 90, 90-96
(providing insight into U.S. maneuvering in the General Assembly and in the Security
Council).
178.
See id. at 95 (stating that the United States planned to use its power to
influence matters in the General Assembly).
See id. at 93, 95 (describing the dual U.S. strategies of diluting opposing
179.
proposals so that they were more consistent with U.S. goals and pressuring the votes of
other countries to favor U.S. proposals).
180.
See id. (stating that the United States had gained a reputation for being
able to gain the support of delegates from other countries by applying its tools of
diplomatic pressure).
See id. (stating that the United States was required to flex its diplomatic
181.
muscle more often than might be desired in order to pursue objectives in the General
Assembly where it only had one vote).
182.
G.A. Res 543 (VI), T 1, U.N. Doc. A/2112 (Feb. 5, 1952); U.N. Planning Staff
Paper, supra note 177.
183.

JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS 162 (1994).
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Though the State Department's ability to execute its strategies
and achieve its goals was unrivaled, when it came time to define what
human rights actually were, it was often reading from a script that
was not its own. So despite the momentous role that the U.S.
delegation played in the actual drafting of the International Bill of
Human Rights, much of the human rights formation process (perhaps
the majority of it) took place far afield from the halls and backrooms
of the United Nations where ink and parchment met.
In significant measure, human rights were defined by members
of the conservative vanguard who connected the ongoing domestic
and international struggles over the role of the market and the place
of the government in society. They grounded for the U.S. public
economic ideas espoused by Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek. They
translated the impenetrable complexities of international law into a
social verse that mothers and fathers recited to their sons and
daughters while reading about the hardships of "Waiting Room
Willie."'18 4 A right was being defined. When the AMA and its
supporters spent several million dollars to change the words "national
healthcare" to "socialized medicine," a right was being defined. And
when the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, no matter how hard
it tried, could not shed its colonial image, the most basic aspects of
existing social relations and divisions moved ever closer to becoming
right.
Four months after the Covenant was split, Eleanor Roosevelt
outlined for the U.S. public the nature of the human rights that the
State Department was then fighting for.i s 5 As she spoke to members
of the press with script in hand, it might have seemed as if these
human rights were created not by the State Department, but by
Senators such as Robert Taft and Harry Byrd. 8 6 Indeed they were.
Having accepted their advice and now beseeching consent, Roosevelt
promised that none of the human rights that the United States was
sponsoring at the United Nations would allow anyone a "free ride
''1 8 7
through life at the expense of the government.

Comics in the Fight Against Government-Controlled Medicine, supra note
184.
67 at 46-47.
185.
See Roosevelt, supra note 148, at 1024-26 (describing the rights that were
to be included in the covenants, how those rights comported with American rights and
the Constitution, and the changes that needed to be made to the covenants).
186.
Recall the blistering condemnations leveled by these senators at the AMA
House of Delegates meeting the year before. See supra text accompanying notes 124133.
187.
Roosevelt, supra note 148, at 1024. Attaining Senate input can occur
informally long before an actual treaty is officially put to vote in chamber. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds of senators present to concur in order for
the President to make a treaty).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45-'1341

The human rights she spoke of could also be found in the text of
William Fitzpatrick's editorials and the AMA's campaign materials.
She declared that the covenants would not impress upon the United
States "any provisions which depart from the American way of life"; a
promise that would be kept, no matter what social arrangements that
phrase invoked.18 8
Roosevelt continued on, informing all those who had taken part
in these struggles of the State Department's plan to enshrine the
human rights they had just helped create.1 89 The draft covenants also
contained the rights of those who had come to abhor the United
Nations and fear that international human rights would limit
American liberty. Roosevelt explained that the State Department was
busy fighting for the inclusion of several "special provisions" to
prevent any "dilution or diminution of our rights and freedoms." 190
First, because the covenants were non-self-executing, she explained
to her fellow Americans, they would not and could not automatically
become enforceable law in the United States. 191 Then turning to the
hordes of states' rights stalwarts, she assured them that with the
federal state clause in place, the covenants would have no impact on
192
All
matters that fell into the jurisdiction of the individual states.
such affairs-whatever they might be--"will remain with the
93
states."1
Roosevelt revealed that the State Department was also fighting
for the human rights of those who feared communism. She promised
that human rights in no way contained any traces of "communism,
socialism, syndicalism, or statism. '194 As for social and economic
rights-the rights championed by so many non-Western states,
though most strongly associated with the Communist Bloc-she
assured the U.S. public that they were not actually "rights" but
merely goals or aspirations to be achieved over time. 195 These
principles were, in fact, of such a different species that they did not
belong together with the type of civil and political rights that were in
196
the Constitution.

188.
See Roosevelt, supra note 148, at 1026 (emphasis added). The "American
way of life" was a phrase often invoked by conservatives and segregationists.
189.
See id. (stating that "[tihere is a long drafting job still ahead" and asking
for open-mindedness until the provisions are in their final form).
190.
Id. at 1025.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1024. Note: in the official text of her press statement, quotation
195.
marks are used around the word "rights" when discussing socioeconomic rights, but not
when mentioning civil and political rights.
196.
Roosevelt made other similar statements to the press about the need for
two covenants. See, e.g., Eleanor Roosevelt, Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
25 DEP'T ST. BULL 1059, 1059, 1064-66 (1951).
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The State Department could not ignore the fact that the smaller
and non-Western states (potential Cold War allies for the United
States) had also named what was right for them. Indeed, in a
previous press statement, Roosevelt circled around and said that
though they should be housed in separate quarters, "each group of
'197
rights [was] of equal importance.
And as for its own notion of right, the State Department chose a
definition that would help it maintain its position of moral and
political leadership in the international sphere: human rights were
"part of an international effort designed to acquaint the world with
198
the ideas of freedom."
But amidst this spectacle of a supposedly natural concept
turning positive, the United States' recent political victory over
socioeconomic rights amounted to a great concession: the center of the
human rights project had not held. And so the Covenant was drawn
and bifurcated. The supposed organic unity and universality of its
constituent parts was no match for the competing social forces that
wrenched right from right and fractured the nascent human rights
concept along the fault lines that had been present from the start.
This was not just about law, politics, or ideas-this most
fundamentally was about people. So clearly imprinted on the face of
the human rights that were born from these struggles are the
invisible lines that at the time cut swaths through the social terrain,
as the global West pulled from the East and the North from the
South, separating prosperity and poverty, and people from people.
These are the social struggles that in the late 1940s and early 1950s
created the foundation of the modern international system of human
rights.

V. CONCLUSION

The prospect of incorporating socioeconomic rights into the
Covenant aroused strong opposition amongst interest groups,
powerful legislative blocs, and professional organizations (most
notably the AMA). Because an enforceable human rights treaty that
contained those rights was sure to be rejected by the Senate, during
the drafting of the Covenant, the United States became a dedicated
opponent of socioeconomic rights. On the international stage,
however, the United States' dismissal of socioeconomic rights put it at
a significant geopolitical disadvantage, as many of the smaller and
non-Western states that were potential Cold War allies for the United
States were amongst the strongest supporters of these rights. To

197.
198.

Id. at 1065.
Roosevelt, supra note 148, at 1026.
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manage these competing forces, the United States developed a
strategy to appear accommodating of socioeconomic rights in the
international setting while simultaneously excluding them from
domestic soil.
The history shows that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the
structures that had protected the United States' post-Civil War racial
and social hierarchies were in danger of crumbling. The federal
government had expanded dramatically and the United States
plunged itself into international affairs-and emerged from World
War II all the better for it. The world had changed. Those who wished
to maintain the social status quo in the United States had to reinvent
the arguments about limited government, free markets, states' rights,
and isolationism that they had used in the past. They, therefore, shed
the provincial character of these arguments and recast them within a
frame of global relationships and human rights.
The bitter opposition that emerged against socioeconomic rights
and the idea of national healthcare in the late 1940s has had lasting
effects-not only on the modern international human rights regime,
but on the nature of the ongoing battles over healthcare in the United
States. This Article identifies the process through which the
opponents of healthcare reform in the 1940s and 1950s created
enduring ideational and institutional structures that now act as safe
havens for continued opposition. This buried history brings to light a
much more comprehensive understanding of the prehistory of the
current controversy over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.

